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Abstract
We provide evidence that a personality trait, aggression, has a first-order effect on
group financial decision making. In a laboratory experiment on group portfolio choice,
highly aggressive subjects (measured by a standard psychology test) were much more
likely to recommend risky investment strategies consistent with their own personal
information, regardless of the information received by other group members. Outside of
this group context, aggression had no effect on subject behavior. Thus, our aggression
measure appears to capture an aggressive disposition, which seeks to dominate group
decisions, rather than simply reflect risk attitudes or cognitive biases.
Introduction 1
The risk taking by financial institutions can have dramatic social consequences, as 2
evidenced by the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, it is not surprising that researchers have 3
attempted to identify the determinants of risk taking by financial institutions. This 4
research has focused on the compensation, risk preferences, and cognitive biases of 5
institutional investors. Undoubtedly, this literature has produced many powerful 6
insights into the behavior of institutional investment managers. However, it has largely 7
ignored the social dynamics of institutional investment policy. Because institutional 8
investment decisions are almost always made collectively in a group context, it is quite 9
plausible to conjecture that these dynamics have a significant effect on institutional 10
investor risk taking. 11
In this paper we propose a new explanation for risk taking, rooted in social 12
psychology—the aggression hypothesis: in group decision contexts, a personality trait, 13
aggressiveness (a sub-trait of the Big Five trait neuroticism), affects how fund managers 14
make investment decisions and thus can account for excessive risk taking even in the 15
absence of contractual incentives, cognitive biases, or risk-loving preferences. This line 16
of research is novel and distinct from both neoclassical economics and behavioral 17
economics. Neoclassical economics focuses on rational choice. Behavioral economics 18
focuses on how the cognitive biases of individual agents distort rational choice. We 19
focus instead on how personality, in a social context, effects group decisions. Personality 20
is largely stable over adult life, can be measured by validated instruments, and has a 21
significant effect on individual and group behavior [1–4]. 22
We provide evidence supporting the aggression hypothesis through a series of 23
laboratory experiments in which seasoned financial professionals make portfolio 24
allocation decisions. In these experiments, we placed subjects in different decision 25
PLOS 1/16
scenarios. In all of these scenarios, or treatments, the subjects were confronted with a 26
choice between a safe and risky asset. In all treatments, given the totality of 27
information available to the subjects, the risky asset was a dominated choice for any 28
risk-neutral or risk-averse investor. 29
In the baseline treatment, the subjects made a recommendation to a simulated 30
investment group. Each subject received a personal rumor, a signal of the returns on 31
the risky asset, and was informed about the rumors received by other members of the 32
group. When a subject’s personal rumor favored investing in the risky asset, the subject 33
faced a choice: On the one hand, recommending the safe asset is the optimal choice 34
based on expected utility maximization. On the other hand, recommending the safe 35
asset favors a group decision inconsistent with the information the subject personally 36
contributes to the decision. The social psychology literature has associated aggression 37
with a desire for dominance in the group-decision domain. Thus, the aggression 38
hypothesis predicts that, in this sort of group context, more aggressive subjects will be 39
more likely to recommend the risky asset. Our experimental evidence confirms this 40
hypothesis. In fact, a one standard deviation increase in aggressiveness approximately 41
doubled the estimated probability of a subject recommending the risky asset. 42
The conclusion that this evidence favors the aggression hypothesis rests on two 43
assumptions. (i) Measured aggression, the score of subjects on our instrument, actually 44
identifies the personality trait aggression. (ii) The effect of measured aggression on 45
subject behavior does not simply result from correlation between measured aggression 46
and the individual risk preferences or cognitive biases of the subjects. The social 47
psychology literature has largely established the validity of our aggressiveness 48
instrument and thus we take (i) as a maintained hypothesis. (ii) requires further 49
investigation. The alternative to (ii) is the proxy hypothesis: measured aggression 50
correlates with the risk preferences or cognitive biases of the subjects and, outside of 51
this channel of influence, is unrelated to subject behavior. 52
To evaluate the proxy hypothesis, we implemented three control treatments in which 53
group-decision dominance through signal-correlated recommendations was not possible. 54
The investor characteristics identified in the economic and cognitive psychology 55
literature adhere to preferences over asset returns and beliefs about the probabilistic 56
structure of asset returns. As such, these characteristics do not vary with the social 57
context of the investment decision. Hence, if the proxy hypothesis is correct, then the 58
effects of preference and belief characteristics, proxied by measured aggression, should 59
be insensitive to the social context of decision making. Thus, given the strong effect of 60
aggression on behavior in the baseline treatment, if aggression is proxying for these 61
characteristics, aggression should also have a significant effect on subject choice in the 62
control treatments, which differ from the baseline treatment not with respect to the 63
returns offered by menu of assets but rather with respect to social context. We found 64
that in all of these control treatments, aggression had no significant effect on investor 65
behavior. 66
Overall, these results support the aggression hypothesis and provide no support for 67
the proxy hypothesis. Thus, they suggest that a personality trait, aggression, has a 68
first-order effect on group investment decisions, an effect that is largely independent of 69
risk preferences and cognitive biases of the individuals composing the group. Highly 70
aggressive group members placed so much weight on dominating the decision process, 71
that they recommend risk-taking strategies that appear to be dominated given their 72
individual risk preferences. 73
This paper is part of a fast-growing albeit small literature on the effect of personality 74
on portfolio-investment behavior. Most economic research on personality traits has 75
focused on the effect of personality traits on “soft skills” and human capital, e.g., 76
investment in parenting and education (See [5] for a comprehensive discussion). The 77
PLOS 2/16
much smaller body of research on the effect of personality traits on portfolio allocations 78
has primarily focused on personality’s effect on the individual portfolio choices of 79
private investors [6–8]. In contrast, this paper focuses on personality’s effects on 80
allocation decisions by professional investment managers. Perhaps the paper most 81
closely related to this topic is Andersson et al. [9]. Andersson et al. performs a 82
experiment on a random sample of the Danish population. The experiment provided 83
subjects with rewards intended to emulate the high-powered compensation schemes 84
frequently used in the investment-management industry. Subjects individually made 85
portfolio allocations that affected their rewards as well as the value of the simulated 86
investment portfolio. Reward maximization favored investing in the risky asset while 87
portfolio value maximization favored the safe asset. They found that the Big 5 88
personality factors associated with pro-social behavior, specifically agreeableness and 89
extroversion, mitigated, but did not eliminate, subject risk taking. In contrast to 90
Andersson et al., our study was performed on professional money managers rather than 91
a random population sample, and our aim was not to identify the effects of personality 92
on subject behavior in an individual-decision setting, but rather to identify the effects of 93
personality on professional managers in a group-decision setting. 94
The effects of personality traits identified in this paper have important implications, 95
both for researchers and practitioners. For researchers, they suggest that group 96
investment behavior cannot be adequately modeled without considering the effect of 97
personality on group dynamics. Our research is but a first step in this direction. We 98
only considered the question of the effect of personality on a desire for decision 99
dominance and not, for example, the question of the effect of personality on the ability 100
to attain decision dominance. We conjecture that other personality traits, e.g., 101
extroversion, might be quite relevant for answering this question. Rather than being 102
thought of as the final word on personality and group investment behavior, our research 103
can best be viewed as a guidepost pointing to a very fertile and largely unexplored field 104
of research: the role of personality in shaping group financial-decision making. 105
The practical and social implications of these results are perhaps even more 106
significant. Risk taking by financial institutions can cause significant harm to the 107
institutions (e.g., the London Whale and J. P. Morgan) and to the overall economy (e.g., 108
2008 financial crisis). Identifying a novel covariate that has a first-order effect on risk 109
taking, a covariate that can be easily observed and manipulated at fairly low cost, can 110
greatly increase the effectiveness and efficiency of institutional risk management 111
systems. The personality trait aggression appears, given our results, to be just such a 112
variable. Because personality traits, such as aggressiveness, are largely constant over 113
adult life and can be measured by validated instruments, and because aggressiveness 114
appears to have first-order effects on risk-taking behavior, low-cost interventions aimed 115
to control the average aggressiveness of money managers might significantly reduce the 116
risk of the financial system. Thus, our result suggest practical measures such as 117
personality screening and training, that firms and regulators can undertake to 118
significantly mitigate risk taking in the financial sector. 119
Results and Discussion 120
Methods and hypotheses 121
Subject consent and institutional approval 122
This experiment was conducted in the Sa¨ıd Business School, following the rules and 123
regulations of the Oxford Experimental Laboratory OXLAB (http://oxlab.oii.ac.uk/) 124
where ethical review is standardized for conventional socioeconomic experiments such as 125
this one. This means that the treatment of participants was in agreement with the 126
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ethical guidelines of the Central University Research Ethics Committee of the 127
University of Oxford (http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/curec/). Permission was obtained 128
from the Said Business School Departmental Research Ethics Committee, which is 129
reports to the Social Sciences and Humanities Interdivisional Research Ethics 130
Committee, which in turns reports to the Central University Research Ethics 131
Committee. For full details on the structure of the University research ethics 132
committees please see: https://researchsupport.admin.ox.ac.uk/governance 133
/ethics/committees/drecs#collapse1-0. At the time of the experiment, the Chair of the 134
Social Sciences Interdivisional Research Ethics Committee was Professor Colin Mayer. 135
Specifically, all participants gave their informed consent to participate voluntarily, 136
assuring them that the analysis and publication of experimental data would be without 137
an association to their real identities. The experiment involved no deception of 138
participants. As in other socioeconomic experiments, there was no additional ethical 139
concerns. 140
Subjects we emailed in advance to ask if they wanted to participate in the 141
experiment, with brief explanation of what is involved. At the beginning of the 142
experiment we explained again what is involved and how the data will be treated and 143
subjects had the opportunity to leave before the experiment started if they had any 144
concerns. The ethics committee accepted that this procedure (subjects turning up to a 145
written invite, and given verbal explanation again at the beginning the experiment) 146
constituted clear and sufficient consent. 147
Design approach 148
Our experiment was designed to investigate the effect of personality on the investment 149
choices of individuals making decisions in a group context. Thus, we aimed to isolate 150
the effect of personality on investment preferences. This objective requires collecting the 151
individual choices of the group members before interaction with other members, 152
abstracting from the subjects’ beliefs about future market returns or attractive 153
investment choices as well as from the ability of group members to induce the group to 154
implement their preferred choices. Subject to this constraint we aimed to implement the 155
experiment using the principle of ecological design [10]: designing and framing the 156
problem so that it resembles the problems these subjects typically encounter in 157
everyday life, rather than framing the problem as an abstract calculation problem. 158
Thus, we recruited experienced practitioners for the experiment. In addition we 159
provided subjects with the sort of qualitative information they would likely receive 160
when making a real investment choice. Thus, we did not provide specific probability 161
distributions for the signals or “rumors” the subjects received as such parametric 162
information about signals would never be provided to them in work situations. In 163
addition, we made every effort to make the look and feel of the decision problem as real 164
as possible through our choice of language and the user interface. In the baseline 165
treatment, subjects were placed in groups of five and each received her own signal. The 166
five signals received by the group members appeared on the screen of each group 167
member one after the other, giving the impression of information arriving in real time. 168
Subjects then made an initial “recommendation” which could be accompanied with a 169
message to the group members. We tried to avoid subjects believing, based on past 170
work experience, that risk taking is optimal by framing the problem in a mutual-fund 171
context rather than a hedge fund or proprietary trading context. Despite the fact that 172
the monetary rewards offered in the experiment did not favor risk taking, such 173
erroneous perceptions of trade-offs might bias subjects. 174
At the same time, consistent with our objective of capturing risk-taking preferences 175
of individuals acting in group context rather than the participants’ opinions regarding 176
specific stocks, we provided only the minimal contextual information required to make 177
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the problem appear to be a real investment problem. For example, we never specified 178
the index tracked by the tracking portfolio or the industry in which its alternative, the 179
stock, operates. By specifying that the information signals concern the alternative stock 180
investment, we minimized the effect of agent optimism or pessimism regarding overall 181
economic and/or stock market performance. Because we recorded only the 182
recommendation of subjects, made before interaction, our approach also controlled for 183
the contaminating effect of subjects’ ability to influence other subjects. 184
Specific protocols 185
Experiment 1 was conducted on January 17th 2014 with 52 participants. Experiment 2 186
was conducted on September 29th, 2016 and had 72 participants. Both experiments 187
used participants from the (2014 and then 2016) Diploma in Financial Strategy course 188
at the Sa¨ıd Business School, University of Oxford (http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk 189
/programmes/degrees/dfs). All participants gave their informed consent to participate 190
voluntarily, assuring them that the analysis and publication of experimental data would 191
be without an association to their real identities. 192
In Experiment 1, the gender split was 80% male and 20% female, while in 193
Experiment 2 it was 72% male and 28% female. The demographic distribution of 194
subjects was as similar in both experiments. The participants’ ethnic backgrounds were 195
varied, and, on average, participants had just over 11 years of experience making 196
investment decisions in the Experiment 1 and just under 10 years in Experiment 2. 197
Each experiment lasted about 30-45 minutes. The software used was an online 198
experimental platform which the subjects accessed through their web browsers. The 199
software randomly determined whether a subject encountered the individual or the 200
group experimental task first. Similarly the order of the three treatments in the second 201
experiment was also randomized. The software recorded all inputs from the participants. 202
Each subject was presented with a choice between passively tracking the index or 203
investing in a stock called “stock A.” In some treatments subjects were told that they 204
were part of a group. Subjects received information signal(s) about the returns to stock 205
A. The signals were called “rumors.” After observing the signal(s) subjects made a 206
decision. In the individual experiments the decision was whether to buy stock A or buy 207
the index. In the group experiments, a subject’s decision was whether to recommend 208
buying stock A or recommend buying the index. In some group experiments, subjects 209
could also send messages supporting their recommendations. In order to simplify the 210
discussion of our results, we will refer to both the choice of buying stock, in the 211
individual experiment, and the choice of recommending the stock, in the group 212
experiment, as choosing to “invest.” Similarly, we will refer to both the choice of the 213
index, in the individual experiment, and recommending the index, in the group 214
experiment, as choosing to “track.” 215
After a few practice rounds, subjects submitted one decision. The order in which the 216
treatments were performed on subjects was randomized by the software. After 217
completing the investment decision problems, subjects completed the standard Hold and 218
Laury risk assessment task and then answered questions from a survey instrument 219
which encompassed the Big Five, the Rotter Scale (Locus of Control), and the Buss and 220
Perry aggression questionnaire, our instrument for measuring aggressiveness. In 221
addition, they provided demographic information. 222
At the end of the experiment, four subjects were selected at random and were paid 223
depending on their choices and performance: Consistent with the instructions, they 224
received £20 if they chose to track the index. If they chose to invest in the new stock 225
their pay was determined by a random draw to be either £24 or £14. The probabilities 226
of a high and low draw were determined by the objective Bayesian probabilities of a 227
high or low return. The instructions to the subjects and the visual presentation of the 228
PLOS 5/16
interface software is provided in an supplementary files, S2 File and S3 File. Subjects 229
were not misled in any way by our focus on these instances. Misleading subjects is 230
something we are against and in any case would contravene the rules imposed by our 231
laboratory – see http://oxlab.oii.ox.ac.uk/public/oxlabguidelines.pdf for more details. 232
The distribution of realized subject payoffs for the experiment was conditioned on the 233
same instance reported to the subjects. Thus, our description of the game was 234
consistent with the actual process by which rewards were allocated. Similar designs 235
have been used in other economic experiments such as [11]. 236
Treatments 237
In all treatments the following background, i.e., prior information, about the return 238
characteristics of the two assets was provided. Subjects were informed that Stock A, 239
henceforth simply called the “stock,” either earned the index return plus 20% or the 240
index return less 30%. The index returned 20% with certainty. Subjects were advised 241
that, absent any information signals, the high and low return for the stock are equally 242
likely. Given this prior information, a risk-averse or risk-neutral expected utility 243
maximizing investor would always prefer tracking. 244
In addition, the subjects received a signal, and in all but one of the treatments, 245
observed signals received by other subjects or groups of subjects. In some group 246
treatments, the signals were “personalized,” i.e., subjects were informed that each group 247
member would receive a possibly different signal. In other group treatments, the signals 248
were “uniform” within a group, i.e., subjects were told that the group as a whole 249
received the signal. The signal could either be “good” or “bad.” Subjects were informed 250
that when the future return on the stock is low, a bad signal is more likely than a good 251
signal and, when the future return on the stock is high, a good signal is more likely to 252
be received than a bad signal. 253
As we show in the supplementary file, S1 File, for an objective Bayesian agent, the 254
revision in the prior probability induced by the observed signals depends only on the 255
difference between the number of good and bad signals. In all designs, the number of 256
bad signals exceeded the number of good signals by one. Thus, for an objective 257
Bayesian agent the posterior information provided by the signals would make investing 258
even less attractive in all treatments. 259
Our baseline treatment was the group/personalized treatment. Subjects were advised 260
that they were members of a group of five. Subjects received a personal signal, ”good,” 261
and were told that other group members received three bad and one good signal. Each 262
subject made a recommendation for the group decision: track or invest. In addition to 263
sending a recommendation, subjects could also send a message, providing a rationale for 264
the recommendation. In this treatment the decision is a group decision but subjects had 265
personalized information. If subjects take ownership of this information, then an 266
aggressive disposition, which the social psychology literature has associated with a desire 267
for dominance in the decision domain, should make an aggressive subject more likely 268
than a less aggressive subject to recommend investing after receiving a good signal, and 269
thereby increase the likelihood that her information determines the group decision. 270
We also implemented three control treatments. In the first, group/uniform Subjects 271
were advised that all subjects in their group received the same signal and were also 272
informed about signals received by other groups. In this treatment, the subject’s group 273
received a good signal, the other groups received three bad signals and one good signal. 274
Each subject made a recommendation for the group decision: track or invest. Subjects 275
could not send messages defending their recommendation. In the second, 276
individual/multiple, subjects were told that there were 10 other analysts, six of whom 277
received bad signals while four received good signals. They were then told that their 278
own signal was good. Each subject made an individual investment decision: track or 279
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invest. In the third, individual/single, subjects were told that they received a bad signal. 280
No signals from other analysts were reported. Each subject made an individual 281
investment decision: track or invest. 282
Each of these control treatments was aimed at parsing the effects of group dynamics 283
on the decision process. The group/uniform treatment was essentially identical to the 284
baseline treatment except that the opportunity to establish decision dominance by 285
ensuring the subjects own information determined the group decision was absent. This 286
treatment was designed to control for the pure effect of switching from an 287
individual-decision context to a group-decision context and the change in framing of the 288
decision as a decision to buy versus recommending to buy. A number of economic 289
theorists (e.g., [12]) have postulated dual self models of decision making in which agents’ 290
individual preference functions are context dependent. In our setting, for example, 291
under the dual-self hypothesis, an agent might have risk-averse preferences when 292
making individual portfolio decisions but risk-loving preferences when making 293
committee investment recommendations. Because both the group/single and baseline 294
group/multiple treatments are framed in a group context, under the dual-self 295
hypothesis, in contrast to the aggression hypothesis, we would expect similar subject 296
behavior in these two treatments. 297
The two individual treatments abstract entirely from the group setting and thus 298
eliminate the effects of group social dynamics. The two individual treatments were 299
designed to provide a sharp test of whether aggression affects subject behavior only 300
through its correlation with risk preferences and cognitive biases. In these treatments, 301
the aggression hypothesis does not predict an effect of aggressiveness on subject 302
behavior. The individual/single treatment also abstracts from cognitive biases resulting 303
from overweighting own signal relative to the signals received by others. The 304
problematic aspect of this treatment is that the constraint that the number of good 305
signals is one less than the number of bad signals requires that the subject receive a bad 306
signal while the subject receives a good signal in the baseline treatment. Although only 307
the difference between the number of good and bad signals affects Bayesian revisions, 308
the absolute number of signals, whether the signal is good or bad, or is identified with 309
the subject, might affect decision making for subjects with behavioral cognitive biases. 310
For this reason, we also implemented the individual/multiple treatment in which 311
subjects received the good signal and observed many signals. 312
Predictions 313
In all treatments, deviating from the index by investing is a dominated choice under 314
almost any standard specification of preferences. Subjects were informed that absent 315
any “signals” the stock was equally likely to go up or down. Under this assessment, the 316
expected return on the stock is less than the expected return on the index and the 317
return on the stock is riskier. Moreover, in the experiment, the subjects always received 318
more bad signals than good signals, and were told that bad signals are correlated with 319
low stock returns. 320
In fact, as we show in the supplementary file, S1 File, a risk-neutral or risk-averse 321
objective Bayesian subject will prefer tracking the index to investing in the stock. In 322
fact, for an objective Bayesian, posteriors will only depend on prior beliefs and the 323
difference between the number of good and bad signals, which is the same in all 324
treatments. Thus, from the perspective of an objective Bayesian subject who, absent 325
information, assigns uniform probabilities to events, the treatments are equivalent. 326
Assuming subjects are either risk averse or risk neutral, the testable prediction of the 327
objective Bayesian hypothesis is therefore that subjects make the same investment 328
decision, track, in all treatments. 329
Experimental researchers have discovered that Bayesian/Nash predictions of subject 330
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behavior are difficult to confirm in experimental settings. Nevertheless, frequently, 331
quantile response models based on Bayesian best replies closely fit subject behavior [13]. 332
In quantile response models, subjects play strategies with a probability that is 333
proportional to the payoff from the strategy in the Bayes/Nash equilibrium. The 334
strategy that yields the highest payoff is not played with probability one. However, the 335
odds that the agent will play a given strategy versus another strategy increase in the 336
difference in the payoffs produced by the two strategies. Given that increased risk 337
aversion increases the payoff difference between the two strategies, the quantile response 338
model predicts that, in both treatments, low risk-aversion subjects are more likely to 339
invest in the stock. Again, the group vs. individual context should have no effect on 340
subject behavior. Thus, the testable prediction of the quantile response formulation is 341
that increasing risk aversion increases the likelihood of tracking. 342
Our alternative hypothesis, the aggression hypothesis, is that personality, and 343
aggression in particular, matters. Aggressive agents engage in less risky decisions in the 344
gains domain, but more risk taking in the domain of losses [14]. Aggressiveness is 345
associated with a strong desire for dominance over others [15]. Moreover, social 346
psychology research such as [16] has documented that aggression has a stronger effect 347
on behavior in group contexts. Thus, the aggression hypothesis predicts that, in group 348
contexts that afford an opportunity for subjects to exert decision dominance though 349
recommendations, i.e., our baseline treatment, aggressiveness will be positively 350
correlated with choosing to invest rather than track. 351
Outcomes 352
Summary statistics 353
The raw data produced by the experiment are provided in the supplementary files S4 354
File and S5 File. Summary statistics for the independent variables used in the study are 355
presented in Table 1. As one might expect, given that the experiment recruited financial 356
professionals, the mean age of subjects was fairly high (35) and right skewed. Mean 357
experience has the same characteristics. In contrast to these demographic variables, the 358
instruments used to measure personality factors and risk preferences, except for Rotter 359
scale, exhibited little skewness and less L-Kurtosis than a Normal distribution 360
(L-Kurtosis of the normal ≈ 0.1226). This is not surprising given that the design of 361
these instruments was to some extent shaped by a desire for producing “regular 362
distributions.”
Table 1. Summary statistics
AGG AGREE ROTT NEURO OPEN CONS EXTRA RISK EXP AGE
Mean 26.80 32.90 16.40 20.90 38.20 34.70 28.50 6.22 10.00 36.60
Median 26.00 33.00 20.00 21.00 38.00 35.00 28.00 6.00 8.00 35.00
Std. Dev. 7.65 5.15 12.30 5.45 4.30 4.91 4.92 2.90 7.03 8.52
Mean Dev. 8.67 5.81 13.90 6.25 4.82 5.56 5.56 3.26 7.63 9.68
L-CV 0.16 0.09 0.42 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.26 0.38 0.13
L-Skewness 0.10 -0.07 0.06 0.06 -0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.21 0.10
L-Kurtosis 0.09 0.12 -0.06 0.07 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.06
363
Table 2 presents the sample correlations between the variables measured in the 364
experiment. Except for the unsurprising positive correlation between age and 365
experience, none of the correlations exceed 0.50. Risk aversion’s correlation with the 366
personality variables was, in general, very weak. Perhaps surprisingly, the correlation 367
between risk aversion and aggression was positive ρ = 0.12, i.e., aggressive subjects were 368
more risk averse on average. This pattern of correlation makes it difficult to argue that 369
aggression is a proxy for risk tolerance. Aggression exhibited a strong negative 370
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correlation with agreeableness (ρ = −0.44), and, as predicted by psychological theory, it 371
exhibited a fairly strong positive correlation with neuroticism (ρ = 0.27).
Table 2. Correlation Matrix
AGG AGREE ROTT NEURO OPEN CONS EXTRA RISK GENDER EXP AGE
AGG 1.00 -0.44 -0.04 0.27 -0.02 -0.20 -0.05 0.11 0.06 -0.09 -0.16
AGREE – 1.00 0.07 -0.42 0.07 0.21 0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.10 0.06
ROTT – – 1.00 -0.13 0.07 0.23 0.02 0.18 -0.04 -0.03 0.13
NEURO – – – 1.00 -0.04 -0.26 -0.25 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.06
OPEN – – – – 1.00 0.08 0.31 0.04 -0.17 0.13 0.20
CONSC – – – – – 1.00 0.08 0.09 -0.13 0.15 0.05
EXTRA – – – – – – 1.00 0.16 -0.16 0.02 -0.12
RISK – – – – – – – 1.00 0.06 0.03 0.14
GENDER – – – – – – – – 1.00 0.14 0.16
EXP – – – – – – – – – 1.00 0.67
AGE – – – – – – – – – – 1.00
372
The dependent variable in this study is the subjects’ portfolio decision: track or 373
invest. In the subsequent logistic regressions, the decision to track is coded as 0 while 374
the decision to invest is coded as 1. The number of subjects choosing to invest or track 375
is presented in Table 3. Table 3 reveals that subjects in Experiment 2 were more likely 376
to invest than subjects in Experiment 1 and that the variation in proportion of subjects 377
investing is larger between experiments than between treatments.
Table 3. Subject portfolio decisions in the experiments.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Treatment Decision Treatment Decision
# track # invest # track # invest
group/multiple: 35 10 group/multiple: 42 30
individual/single: 32 13 group/single: 40 32
individual/multiple: 43 29
378
The correlations between the track/invest decisions within the two experiments is 379
presented in Table 4. The table reveals that the correlation between the decisions in the 380
baseline treatment, group/multiple, and decisions in the other treatments is fairly low, 381
ρ ≤ 0.25. In contrast, in Experiment 2, which implemented two control treatments, 382
group/single and individual/multiple, the correlation between decisions in the control 383
treatments was high, almost 0.60. This suggests that the determinants of portfolio 384
choice in the control treatments, which abstract from group dominance effects, are more 385
similar to each other than they are to the determinants of choice in the baseline 386
treatment.
Table 4. Correlations between decisions: The table presents the correlation coefficient between
decisions in the treatments implemented in the two experiments, Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
(a) Experiment 1
group/multiple individual/single
group/multiple 1.00 0.25
individual/single – 1.00
(b) Experiment 2
group/multiple group/single individual/multiple
group/multiple 1.00 0.17 0.21
group/single – 1.00 0.58
individual/multiple – – 1.00
387
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Baseline group/multiple treatment 388
The key question we are investigating is the effect of aggression on portfolio choice 389
behavior in a group setting. This question is directly addressed by the baseline 390
group/multiple treatment. Fig 1 depicts the empirical cumulative probability 391
distribution of the aggression scores of subjects conditioned on tracking and investing in 392
the two experiments. 393
Fig 1. The cumulative distribution of aggression scores conditioned on tracking and investing in 394
Experiments 1 and 2. In each of the panels of the figure, the horizontal axes labeled “AGG” represents 395
subject scores on the aggression instrument. In both panels, the empirical cumulative distributions 396
conditioned on investing (dashed line), F (·|Invest), and tracking (solid line), F (·|Track), are depicted. 397
As is apparent from Fig 1, in both experiments, measured aggression was much 398
higher for subjects choosing to invest. In fact, the empirical cumulative distribution 399
conditioned on investing in Experiment 2, F (·|Invest), was stochastically larger, in the 400
sense of first-order stochastic dominance, then the empirical distribution conditioned on 401
tracking. In Experiment 1, it was nearly stochastically larger. Fig 1 provides very direct 402
evidence that measured aggression was strongly positively correlated with investing. 403
This evidence is confirmed by standard univariate statistical tests in Table 5. The 404
table presents a representative non-parametric test, Mann-Whitney, and a parametric 405
test, a logistic regression. The Mann-Whitney test statistic U is used to evaluate the 406
null hypothesis that the median aggression score of tracking subjects is the same as the 407
median aggression score of investing subjects. The test decisively rejects the null 408
hypothesis in both experiments. In the logistic regression, the coefficient for the 409
aggression measure is positive and highly significant.
(c) Experiment 1
Mann-Whitney Test
µ-Invest µ-Track U P-Value
AGG 32.3 24.6 275 0.006
#Obs. 10 35 – –
Logistic Regression
Estimate Std. Error z-score P value
Intecept -4.835 1.584 -3.053 0.002
AGG 0.127 0.0519 2.448 0.0143
(d) Experiment 2
Mann-Whitney Test
µ-Invest µ-Track U P-Value
AGG 32.9 23.0 1130.0 1.45× 10−8
#Obs. 30 42 – –
Logistic Regression
Estimate Std. Error z-score P value
Intecept -8.74784 1.956 -4.471 7.795× 10−6
AGG 0.303 0.069 4.409 0.00001
Table 5. Effect of aggression in the baseline treatment: The table presents the results of the
non-parametric Mann-Whitney test of the null hypothesis that the median aggression scores of tracking
and non-tracking subjects are equal as well as a univariate logistic regression in which the dependent
variable is the decision between tracking and investing and the independent variable is the aggression
score.
410
In order to investigate the possibility of confounding effects, we performed a 411
multivariate logistic analysis, including as controls the other personality variables, the 412
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risk-aversion measure, and demographic variables. The results of these regression 413
estimates are provided in Table 6. Once again the coefficient associated with aggression 414
is positive and very significant in both experiments. None of the coefficients associated 415
with the other variables are significant at the conventional 5% level. Both experiments
(a) Experiment 1
Estimate Std. Error z-Statistic P-Value
Intercept -3.720 8.430 -0.441 0.659
AGG 0.166 0.076 2.190 0.028
AGREE 0.025 0.112 0.226 0.821
ROTTER 0.230 0.458 0.503 0.615
NEURO -0.010 0.089 -0.113 0.910
OPEN -0.054 0.132 -0.410 0.682
CONS -0.065 0.107 -0.606 0.545
EXTRA -0.013 0.096 -0.136 0.892
RISK -0.061 0.302 -0.203 0.839
GENDER -0.511 1.440 -0.355 0.723
EXP -0.025 0.088 -0.278 0.781
AGE 0.062 0.076 0.812 0.417
(b) Experiment 2
Estimate Std. Error z-Statistic P-Value
Intercept -21.000 8.720 -2.410 0.016
AGG 0.352 0.085 4.160 0.000
AGREE -0.002 0.102 -0.017 0.987
ROTTER -0.071 0.085 -0.839 0.401
NEURO -0.007 0.088 -0.083 0.934
OPEN 0.168 0.108 1.560 0.120
CONS 0.203 0.114 1.780 0.076
EXTRA 0.046 0.090 0.504 0.615
RISK 0.015 0.123 0.124 0.901
GENDER 0.498 0.901 0.552 0.581
EXP 0.131 0.084 1.570 0.117
AGE -0.102 0.080 -1.280 0.199
Table 6. Determinants of investing vs. tracking in the baseline treatment: The table presents the
results of a multivariate logistic regression in which the dependent variable is the invest/track decision
and the independent variables are personality, risk preference, and demographic information for the
subjects.
416
Experiments 1 and 2 implement the baseline treatment. However, the alternative 417
treatment to the baseline treatment is different in the two experiments. Thus, in order 418
to control for the effects of this variation, we have presented estimated separate 419
regressions for the two treatments. However, assuming that experience in other 420
treatments did not affect subject behavior in the baseline treatment, the power of the 421
tests can be greatly increased by combining the treatments without incurring bias. 422
Thus, we also present the multivariate logistic results combining the results from the 423
baseline treatments in E1 and E2 in Table 7. The results of the combined analysis in 424
Table 7 are quite consistent with the results for the individual experiments in Table 6. 425
The only notable difference is that ROTTER, an alternative measure of aggressiveness, 426
is significant in the expected (positive) direction in the combined dataset but not 427
significant in the datasets for either individual experiment. This pattern is consistent 428
with the increased power of the regression using the combined data set. However, the 429
p-value associated with ROTTER in the combined regression is still much higher than 430
the p-value associated with measured aggression, AGG. 431
Thus, in the individual experitment baseline treatments, measured aggression, AGG, 432
is the only significant predictor for deviations from the market portfolio. In the 433
combined data set, measured aggression and ROTTER, an alternative proxy for 434
aggression, are the only two significant predictors. Granting that aggression is a 435
significant predictor of deviations from market tracking, naturally raises the question of 436
the magnitude of the aggression effect. To answer this question, we compared the 437
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Estimate Std. Error z-Statistic P-Value
Intercept -11.00 5.130 -2.150 0.032
AGG 0.230 0.047 4.860 0.000
AGREE 0.008 0.060 0.131 0.896
ROTTER 0.048 0.023 2.040 0.042
NEURO -0.007 0.055 -0.129 0.897
OPEN 0.064 0.071 0.903 0.366
CONS -0.003 0.059 -0.058 0.954
EXTRA 0.016 0.060 0.261 0.794
RISK 0.012 0.090 0.136 0.892
GENDER -0.146 0.636 -0.229 0.819
EXP 0.038 0.054 0.706 0.480
AGE -0.003 0.046 -0.077 0.939
Table 7. Determinants of investing vs. tracking in the baseline treatment combining E1 and E2 The
table presents the results of a multivariate logistic regression in which the dependent variable is the
invest/track decision and the independent variables are personality, risk preference, and demographic
information for the subjects.
probability of investing of an investor with a mean level of measured aggressiveness, µ, 438
with the probability of investing of an investor with measured aggressiveness one 439
standard deviation above the mean, µ+ σ, using the coefficient estimates form the 440
multivariate logistic model (very similar results were obtained using the univariate 441
estimates). Our results show that in both experiments, the magnitude of the aggression 442
effect is quite large. In Experiment 1, an increase of one standard deviation increased 443
the estimated probability of investing from 0.184 to 0.383. In Experiment 2, an increase 444
of one standard deviation increased the estimated probability of investing from 0.372 to 445
0.851. Thus, in both experiments, a one-standard deviation increase in measured 446
aggression roughly doubled the probability of investing. 447
In order to further evaluate the aggression/investing relationship we performed 448
robustness tests not reported in the tables. For each variable, in both experiments, we 449
investigated, using both logistic and Mann-Whitney tests, whether, in a univariate 450
setting, the variable predicted investing. We could not reject the null hypothesis of no 451
effect for any of these other variables. Thus, the experimental results in the baseline 452
treatment provide overwhelming support for the hypothesis that in group decisions 453
where group members can vie for decision dominance, aggression has a first-order effect 454
on behavior. An affect that is not captured by standard measures of individual risk 455
preferences or by other personality factors. 456
Control Treatments 457
The baseline treatments show that measured aggression significantly affects investor 458
behavior. The aggression hypothesis asserts that this effect is produced by the channel 459
identified in social psychology, decision dominance in group settings. The most plausible 460
alternative hypothesis consistent with the results in the baseline treatment is the proxy 461
hypothesis : Measured aggression is highly correlated with the characteristics of subjects’ 462
preferences or beliefs. These preferences and beliefs have first-order effects on subjects’ 463
portfolio allocations. Measured aggression effects behavior because it acts as proxy for 464
these characteristics. The control treatments aim to evaluate the plausibility of the 465
proxy hypothesis. The characteristics of preferences and beliefs identified in the 466
economic and cognitive psychology literature adhere to preferences over asset returns 467
and beliefs about the probabilistic structure of asset returns. As such, these 468
characteristics do not vary with the social context of the investment decision. Hence, if 469
the proxy hypothesis is correct, then the effects of preference and belief characteristics 470
should be insensitive to the social context of decision making. Thus, given the strong 471
effect of aggression on behavior in the baseline treatment, if aggression is simply 472
proxying for these characteristics, aggression should also have a significant effect on 473
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subject choice in the control treatments, which differ from the baseline treatment not 474
with respect to the returns offered by menu of assets but rather with respect to social 475
context. 476
For example, if measured aggression proxies for risk-loving preferences, then 477
aggressive subjects should be more likely to invest in all of the control treatments. If 478
aggression proxies for subject confidence in the quality of the signal, than in the 479
individual/single treatment, aggressive subjects should be less likely to invest, as in this 480
treatment the only signal they observe is unfavorable to investing. If aggression proxies 481
for subject arrogance, overweighting the quality of a subject receives relative to other 482
signals observed, then in the group/single treatment aggressive subjects should be more 483
likely to invest as, in this treatment, the subject’s own group received a signal favoring 484
investment. The effect of measured aggression in control treatments is presented in 485
Table 8. The results in Table 8 reveal that in the control treatments measured 486
aggression had essentially no effect on subject decisions. In the control treatments, the 487
hypothesis that the aggressiveness coefficient, AGG, equals 0 cannot be rejected at even 488
the 10% level of confidence. We also tested for a relation between aggression and 489
investing using non-parametric tests and report the results for the Mann-Whitney test. 490
Again, these tests fail to confirm a significant relation between aggression and investing. 491
Treatment Logistic regression estimates Mann-Whitney Test
Estimate Std. Error z-score P value U P value
Group/Single
Intecept -1.605 0.939 -1.708 0.088
AGG 0.052 0.033 1.527 0.127 742.000 0.245
Indvidual/Multiple
Intecept -1.110 0.923 -1.200 0.230
AGG 0.026 0.033 0.805 0.421 657.000 0.696
Indvidual/Single
Intecept -1.200 1.150 -1.050 0.294
AGG 0.011 0.041 0.278 0.781 227.000 0.634
Table 8. Aggression and investing in the control treatments: The table presents the results of
univariate Logistic regressions in which the decision, to invest is the dependent variable and the
independent variable is measured aggression as well as the results of a Mann-Whitney test for the null
hypothesis that the median aggression scores of investing and tracking subjects are equal.
In order to further investigate the difference between the determinants of portfolio 492
choice in the baseline and control treatments, we performed a number of robustness 493
tests not reported in the tables. First, we performed a multivariate logistic regression 494
analysis on each of the control treatments. In all of these regressions, the coefficient 495
associated with aggression was insignificant at the 10% level. Other personality and 496
risk-preference factors did exhibit some predictive power in the control treatments. In 497
the group/single and individual/multiple treatments, univariate and multivariate 498
logistic regressions as well as the Mann-Whitney test identified the personality trait 499
openness as a significant predictor of investing. In the individual/single treatment, risk 500
aversion was identified as a significant predictor of tracking by the Mann-Whitney test. 501
Because the context of individual/single treatment is individual portfolio choices by a 502
single investor, the classic context of individual choice portfolio allocation problems, this 503
result provides some assurance that our instrument for measuring risk aversion, the 504
Holt-Laury questionnaire, is valid. However, in the multivariate models for the three 505
control treatments, the Likelihood ratio test does not reject the hypothesis that the 506
likelihood ratio of the multivariate model is the same as the likelihood ratio of a null 507
model that includes only an intercept term. Given the large number of independent 508
variables relative to the sample size in these regressions, this not too surprising. 509
Nevertheless, it does highlight much stronger predictive power of aggression in the 510
baseline treatment relative to the predictive power of risk and personality measures in 511
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the control treatments. In summary, in the control treatments, aggression did not have 512
first-order predictive power for subject behavior either in absolute terms or relative to 513
other covariates. The control treatments differ from the baseline treatment because they 514
abstract from decision dominance. The opportunity to exercise decision dominance is 515
irrelevant to cognitive and economic models of asset allocation, but highly relevant to 516
the expression of an aggressive disposition. Thus, the control treatments provide no 517
support for the proxy hypothesis. 518
Conclusion 519
This paper considered the effect of personality trait, aggressiveness, on professional 520
managers’ portfolio allocations in a group setting. We found that this personality factor 521
had a very significant effect on behavior, approximately doubling the probability of 522
recommending risky investing strategies. The results also suggest that aggression’s 523
effect on behavior is not simply an artifact of aggressiveness being correlated with 524
properties of beliefs and preferences used by investors to make personal portfolio 525
allocations. In short our results point to a hitherto ignored “elephant in the room”— 526
the effect of personality on risk taking in the social context of the finance industry. We 527
investigated whether a prima facie important non-cognitive trait of fund managers, one 528
that financial firms routinely screen for in hiring—aggressiveness—effects fund manager 529
behavior. We documented strong, economically significant effects of personality on 530
behavior. Given the externalities generated by risk taking by financial firms, our results 531
suggest that the managerial personality may significantly affect financial stability. 532
Admittedly, this paper is a first not a last step in parsing the effect of aggression, 533
and personality in general, on the behavior of professional investors. Although we point 534
to the elephant, we do not provide an explanation of how the elephant got into the 535
room. More theoretical research is required to develop a plausible model of how 536
personality is mediated by preferences, information, and incentives, to produce decisions. 537
More empirical research is required to validate the results of this experiment in the field 538
and explore how other personality factors, such as extroversion, affect the ability of 539
aggressive agents to bend group decisions in their preferred direction. Admittedly, this 540
research will be difficult. The link between personality factors and the economic model 541
of choice is even more “awkward” than the link between the economic model and 542
cognitive biases. However, as with elephants, the fact that a factor is awkward does not 543
imply that it is not powerful or that it can be safely ignored. 544
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